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ExEcutivE Summary
Hotel Network Security: 
A Study of the Computer Networks 
in U.S. Hotels
by Josh Ogle, Erica L. Wagner, and Mark P. Talbert
A 
study of 147 U.S. hotels finds a mixed picture with regard to the security of guests’ 
connections to the hotels’ network, whether by cable or wi-fi. Since many business travelers 
connect remotely to continue working while on the road, the potential for theft of corporate 
information exists. Some hotels still rely on relatively rudimentary hub technology for their 
networks, and these are particularly subject to hacking. Others have upgraded to more secure switches 
or routers. Even better is encryption for wi-fi connections, but that still does not prevent malicious 
users from intercepting guests’ transmissions. An example of a best practice is presented in the case of 
the W Dallas Hotel–Victory, which has set up virtual local area networks (VLANs) for all of its users. 
The VLAN inhibits attackers from using their computer to imitate the hotel’s main server, which is the 
mechanism most would use to intercept other people’s data. Given that the technology exists to increase 
a hotel network’s security, a hotel could potentially be considered at fault for not taking the necessary 
precautions to protect their guests from hackers.
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cornEll hoSPitality rEPort
The security of hotel guests’ communications is of utmost importance. Sometimes, the choice of which hotel to use is made on the basis of security and privacy.1 However, as we explain in this report, many hotels have flaws in their network topology that allow for exploitation by malicious users, thereby resulting in the loss of privacy for guests. In 
particular, we discuss the results of a survey which found that about one hotel in five still uses an 
antiquated hub-based network, a type of arrangement that is inherently flawed in terms of security. 
Similarly, hotels are providing unsecured wireless (wi-fi) connections that are not encrypted and are 
subject to hacking.
1 Joker, retrieved March 10, 2008, from Joker.be, www.joker.be/En.Content.470.aspx.
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All of this should ethically be enough of a reason for a 
hotel to invest in secure, properly implemented networks for 
guest use. More pragmatically, it could potentially be dev-
astating to a hotel’s reputation (as well as bottom line) were 
there ever a lawsuit brought against it for leaking guest data 
because of a network’s insecurity. Taking this into consider-
ation, we set out to study the extent to which such a threat 
exists. We conducted surveys, on-site testing, and interviews 
to gather information. Our study presents recommenda-
tions to hotels to protect the hotel or its network users. This 
includes recommending changes that would protect their 
guests’ wi-fi transmissions. We conclude our report by of-
fering a case study of the W Dallas hotel, which we consider 
to be an example of best practices in hotel network security 
through its use of virtual local area networks (VLANs). We 
also offer checklists for hoteliers interested in improving the 
security of their guest networks.
Background
Business travelers have become accustomed to remaining in 
touch on the road by finding internet hotspots, whether in a 
coffee shop or their hotel. The problem with such remote ac-
cess is that the travelers and their companies often overlook 
the potential security implications of having their data thus 
exposed.
Not all companies have ignored this issue, and many 
have begun to implement security measures.2 We note, how-
ever, that the approach used (typically, requiring valid login 
and password combinations) is hardly ever sufficient to 
2 See, for example: Juniper Networks, August 16, 2004, retrieved March 10, 
2008, www.juniper.net/company/presscenter/pr/2004/pr-040816.html.
stop would-be hackers, unless this arrangement is carefully 
implemented. The weakness is that the company does not 
control the remote link—that is, the hotel’s network. This is 
an oft-overlooked reality that is the basis of many cases of 
corporate data theft.
Wired Networks
Let’s review the basis of Ethernet communications, to see 
where the weaknesses exist. We have compiled a glossary of 
technical terms for your reference, found on the next page. 
Ethernet, the networking technology that is now used by 
over 95 percent of all LANs in the world,3 was developed 
over thirty years ago by a research team led by Robert Met-
calfe at Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center (PARC). Although 
it has seen revisions, the basic concept remains. In tech-
speak, it is described as a “multi-point data communication 
system with collision detection.”4 In normal language, Eth-
ernet is used to connect computers together so that informa-
tion can be exchanged. One of the best things about Ethernet 
is that it is reliable and has proven itself to be the worthiest 
way of setting up a wired network. However, its age, com-
bined with the assumptions made when it was conceived, 
has proven to be Ethernet’s biggest weakness as well.
3 N.S. Nath, Yipes, Teragate Team on Ethernet WAN, May 4, 2007, 
retrieved January 12, 2008, from internetcommunications.tmcnet.com/
topics/enterprise/articles/6649-yipes-teragate-team-ethernet-wan.htm.
4 Xerox, Inc. United States Patent: 4063220, December 13, 1977, 
retrieved January 6, 2008, from patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?u=%2Fnetahtml%2Fsrchnum.htm&Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF
&p=1&r=1&l=50&f=G&d=PALL&s1=4063220.PN.&OS=PN/4063220&R
S=PN/4063220.
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When Ethernet was developed, computer costs were 
prohibitive and thereby limited mostly to company and 
university ownership. A key assumption in the protocol 
was that there would be no malicious users. Moreover, at its 
inception, Ethernet connected computers by cables. With 
few people connected, no one assumed there would be 
anyone but friends and co-workers connecting. With the 
lowering in cost of networking hardware, though, more and 
more companies began to use this excellent way of sharing 
information, and eventually the failure to authenticate users 
became a problem.
The flaws in Ethernet are easy to spot and difficult to 
overcome, even as access to the internet is fast becoming 
an expected amenity within the lodging industry. The best 
way to begin the analysis of how hotels can create relatively 
secure Ethernet services is with a basic understanding of the 
different possible types of networks. It is also worthwhile to 
note that having one type of system in your hotel does not 
preclude putting in another, different kind. In actuality, with 
Glossary 
Address Resolution Protocol or ARP: The network protocol used to 
find a computer’s MAC address. This is the way that each 
computer on a network knows which other computer it is talking 
to. It keeps a “routing table” which connects the IP address, 
which is used on the internet predominantly, and the MAC 
address of a computer, which is used on Ethernet and LANs.
Encryption: An unreadable, cryptographic set of information that 
was created in plain text. Encryption is used so that even if an 
attacker intercepts the information being sent over the network, 
that data thief will (in most circumstances) have no easy way to 
read that information.
Ethernet: In 1974, Robert Metcalfe and David Boggs of Xerox 
presented a draft proposal for a “multipoint data communication 
system with collision detection.” This proposal was met with some 
resistence, but ultimately Xerox applied for and received a patent 
for this new way of communicating between computers. Over 
three decades later and only slightly modified, this is still the 
standard computer network used in almost every LAN in the world.
Hub: An inexpensive, unsophisticated device which simply forwards 
all information it gets on any of its ports to every computer on its 
network.
Internet Protocol or IP: An IP address is, in the simplest terms, the 
address of a computer on the internet. Each computer on the 
internet has its own specific IP address for each session or 
connection.
Local Area Network or LAN: Think of a LAN as a miniature internet, 
where computer connections are only made in a small geographic 
area like an office building or hotel.
MAC Address: A unique address that is assigned to each hardware 
device which connects to the internet. This is hard-coded —it never 
changes—unlike IP, which changes depending on where a person 
connects to the internet.
Packet: A small piece of data sent by one computer to another. Many 
packets are put together to form an entire product such as an 
email, web page, or other document.
Router: The most advanced (and most expensive) of the three types 
of network traffic control devices. These can be configured to filter 
certain types of traffic, to act as a firewall to protect users on its 
network, and to do an array of other advanced networking 
features.
Switch: A slightly more intelligent version of a hub which is able to 
differentiate which computer sent it data and, as such, to which 
computer it should send any related returned data.
Wireless LAN or WLAN: On the surface, this is the same thing as a 
regular LAN, only without wires.
Virtual LAN or VLAN: A local area network that is able to only see 
other computers on its network. While the computer and its traffic 
still flows onto the normal LAN, a computer on a VLAN can only 
see the traffic on its own VLAN, making it difficult for the 
computer to cause security disruptions by imitating a hub or server.
Virtual Private Network or VPN: This is a network that is processed 
inside of another network. A VPN connection may be made to a 
business’s network, and all data passing over the VPN will be 
encapsulated in encrypted packets which travel over whatever 
connection the user is on. So, by having this extra encapsulation 
and tunneling, it makes it impossible for someone to “sniff” the 
information being sent over a vulnerable network at a place such 
as a hotel.
a fairly competent IT staff, it could take as little as a couple 
of hours of switching out server hardware, and for minimal 
cost. The following are three basic ways to configure an 
Ethernet network.
Hubs
The most basic network configuration is to use a hub to 
handle traffic. This is the least expensive but also the least 
secure approach. As we indicated above, our research found 
that around 20 percent of the U.S. hotels we surveyed are 
using this antiquated, insecure network setup. As we discuss 
later, this issue could be fixed relatively easily.
The key problem with a hub is that it simply repeats any 
information that is sent to it. It has no built-in intelligence 
to know who sent what data, so to get the response packets 
(that is, computer data) back to the original sender, it re-
transmits all packets to all users on the network. In an ideal 
situation, only the transmissions that are associated with 
your computer would come back to you. However, this is 
Cornell Hospitality Report • September 2008 • www.chr.cornell.edu   9
network  
hub  
or Switch
impossible since the hub has no way of determining who on 
the network is sending what. 
For example, if a guest in a hotel opened her web 
browser to www.cornell.edu on a hub-based network, the 
Cornell server would respond to the hotel’s network and 
send the files needed to display Cornell’s home page. These 
files would not only be sent to the person who requested 
the webpage, but would actually be sent out to every single 
person on that hotel’s network. Most users would not receive 
this transmission because their computer is not automati-
cally set up to receive other peoples’ information, but any 
malicious user who wishes to illicitly receive these packets 
can do so by putting their network card into “promiscuous 
Network Configurations—Authorized and Otherwise
in normal operation the computers on the lan use arP protocol to 
acquire and memorize each other’s mac address which they use for 
sending network data to each other...
...but the arP protocol provides no protection against misuse. an 
attacking computer on the same lan can simply send spoofed arP 
replies to any other computers, telling them that its mac address 
should receive the traffic bound for other iP addresses.
this “arP cache Poisoning” can be used to redirect traffic 
throughout the lan, allowing any malicious computer to insert 
itself into the communications stream between any other 
computers for the purpose of monitoring and even alter the data 
flowing across the lan.
1
2
3
 Graphics reproduced by permission of Steve Gibson of Gibson Research 
Corporation—GRC.com.
mode.” With that setting, the promiscuous user can view 
all of the information that you, your friends, and anyone 
else connected to the network sends or receives—provided 
it is not encrypted. We emphasize that this eavesdropping 
really requires no competence on the part of the hacker, and 
requires no manipulation of the network. By their nature, 
hubs enable this type of environment.
Switches and Routers
One downside of hub-based networks, since all data are be-
ing re-transmitted to everyone on the network, is consider-
able congestion. Switches were developed in response to this 
congestion. A switch is a semi-intelligent device, slightly 
network  
hub  
or Switch
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the gateway computer’s MAC address. Since no verification 
is needed—all computers on the network trust each other—
the victim’s computer updates its ARP table with the at-
tacker’s information, and from then on all data that are sent 
out of the victim’s computer go to the attacker’s computer 
before going to the real gateway, which is the computer 
connecting the hotel’s network to the internet. 
After this happens, the attacker would then notify the 
router that his computer is the victim’s computer, so now 
when any information is sent back to the victim’s computer, 
it first goes through the attacker’s. By doing this sequence, 
the attack will have successfully set up a “man-in-the-
middle” attack, more specifically known in this case as ARP 
spoofing or ARP poisoning. 
Though this process is technically complicated, tools 
freely available on the internet automate these tasks. It takes 
only five minutes to set up an attack, and the victim never 
knows what is happening. So far, we’ve been discussing this 
process as it would occur on a totally wired network. Next, 
let’s turn to wireless setups, which add another level of 
complications. 
Wireless Networks
As we explain below, our research found that around 90 
percent of hotels are now offering wireless network connec-
tions to guests and sometimes to the general public. This is 
probably fueled by the necessities of today’s business and 
leisure travelers. Most wireless networks, whether in the 
home or business environment, operate under the stan-
dards known as IEEE 802.11, which is a generally accepted 
protocol for wireless devices. Wireless networks can be 
thought of as hub-based networks, just without wires. Thus, 
a wi-fi system has the same vulnerability as the old hub-
based networks. With a wired network, a person at least has 
to be plugged into an Ethernet jack to cause trouble, but 
with a wireless network a person can simply sit in a car out-
side of a hotel and capture all of the information traveling 
over the network, and no one would ever be the wiser.
Beyond the dangers inherent in Ethernet connections, 
a wireless environment has the additional vulnerability of 
more expensive than a hub, that is better than a hub at limit-
ing collisions on an Ethernet network. It does so by learning 
the media access control (MAC) addresses of those who are 
sending data through it, and storing this information in its 
memory. Each MAC address on the network is assigned a 
physical port on the switch, so data come and go only to the 
MAC address with which the information is associated.
Routers work much the same way, but with the addi-
tional abilities to “hide” computers behind it, to route traffic 
in pre-programmed directions, and to act as a firewall to keep 
out unauthorized users. These added capabilities make the 
routers themselves more expensive than switches, though the 
benefits and flexibility gained from having routers imple-
mented makes it well worth the slight increase in cost. Even 
after spending the extra money, though, there are still prob-
lems on the network that need to be addressed.
Both routers and switches are vulnerable to address 
resolution protocol (ARP) spoofing, which takes advantage 
of how Ethernet networks operate. ARP spoofing is depicted 
in the illustrations on the previous page. Most computers’ 
network cards are set up to accept information in only two 
circumstances: (1) when data are sent directly to them and 
they are expecting it, and (2) when data are sent from what is 
called the broadcast address, which is a MAC address that is 
used by the router to help systems on a network find out what 
other computers are connected. 
This arrangement uses the address resolution protocol, as 
follows. When you connect to an in-room computer port, it 
is common for your network card to send out a request to the 
router asking the addresses of all computers connected, and 
(if all is well) the computers on the network then respond 
with their addresses. This process forces the router to act like 
a hub, which opens up the door for a potential attacker to do 
damage.
The potential for exploitation occurs because this process 
makes no provision for authentication of the devices on the 
network. That is, there is no way to determine whether a 
particular user is legitimate. So, what an attacker will do is 
send an ARP reply to any other computer on the network, 
telling that computer that the attacker’s computer is actually 
We concluded that hotels 
in the U.S. are generally ill-
prepared to protect their 
guests from network security 
issues.
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a “rogue hotspot.” Rogue hotspots are essentially a wireless 
network’s version of ARP spoofing. While the actual details 
of the technical setup are different, the result is the same: 
someone unknowingly sends requests through another com-
puter, all the while believing the connection to be authentic. 
Here’s how a rogue hotspot works.
Most operating systems are set up to connect to an open 
wireless network if one is available. Oftentimes, these are 
legitimate connections set up by companies to allow free 
internet access. A rogue hotspot claims to be an open, free 
wireless network, often with an inviting name, such as “Free 
Airport Wi-Fi.” When the unsuspecting user connects, the 
attacker either sits idly by to gather the information that 
the user attempts to send over the network, or establishes a 
legitimate connection to the internet and act just as the ARP 
spoofer would do on a wired network. This way the victim 
continues to use the rogue network and has no idea that any 
information is being intercepted. Fortunately, there are ways 
of alleviating the security concerns that we have discussed, 
as explained after we discuss our survey.
Methodology
Our study employed online surveys, passive on-site testing, 
and interviews to determine the existing network infrastruc-
tures of a broad range of hotels, as well as their collective 
and individual susceptibility to the weaknesses that we have 
outlined. The online survey was sent to opt-in recipients of 
the Cornell School of Hotel Administration’s Center for Hos-
pitality Research list. Of the 5,000 recipients of the survey, 
147 responded in the 76-day period between March 5, 2007, 
and May 19, 2007, equating to a roughly 3-percent comple-
tion rate.
The survey was used in part to determine the hotels’ 
security arrangements (e.g., a router-based network topol-
ogy, secured wireless access points, and limited-liability 
agreement notices to which users must agree) and whether 
these measures help prevent problematic situations (not to 
mention provide a defense in the case of litigation). The sur-
vey targeted IT professionals from a cross-section of hotel 
segments, including business hotels, family-oriented hotels, 
upper- and lower-scale hotels, and branded and independent 
hotels (see Exhibit 1, next page).
The results of this survey provided a foundation for 
our on-site tests, which involved visiting a total of forty-six 
hotels in the following eight cities: Arlington and Virginia 
Beach, Virginia; Charlotte and Raleigh, North Carolina; 
Dallas; Hagerstown, Maryland; Knoxville, Tennessee; and 
Pittsburgh.
You’ll recognize that these eight cities are diverse, and 
each attracts a particular type of visitor. As a banking center, 
for instance, Charlotte attracts business and banking visitors, 
while Virginia Beach is a leisure destination. Hagerstown, in 
contrast, gets most of its traffic from the confluence of inter-
state highways. Consequently, we were able to gain a reason-
able representation of the United States lodging market.
To test for possible weaknesses, co-author Josh Ogle 
brought along a laptop equipped with a modified version 
of the Linux operating system called BackTrack,5 which is 
made specifically for penetration testing of networks. As a 
hacker might do, he also purchased a high-gain, omnidirec-
tional antenna which hooked onto an SMC2532-B EliteCon-
nect High Power wireless card to get better reception of the 
wireless networks’ broadcasts. These were purchased at the 
suggestion of real hackers on an email list called “Full-
Disclosure.”6
Logging onto hotels’ wireless networks was never a 
challenge. First, Ogle simply sat down in the lounge with a 
laptop, started BackTrack, and attempted to connect to the 
network. In the rare case that the network required a pass-
word or any other method of authentication, he would sim-
ply request the access instructions from the hotel staff, who 
were always glad to oblige. After connecting, he would load 
a packet-capturing program called Ethereal,7 and capture 
approximately 1,000 packets. If any of these packets were not 
5 Remote-Exploit.org—Supplying Offensive Security Products to the World, 
retrieved July 5, 2007, from www.remote-exploit.org/backtrack.html.
6 grok.org.uk/full-disclosure, March 6, 2005, retrieved July 5, 2007, from 
www.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure/.
7 Ethereal: A Network Protocol Analyzer, March 1, 2007, retrieved July 5, 
2007, from www.ethereal.com/.
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normal “broadcast” packets (such as ARP, AppleTalk), and 
if he was able to see HTTP (website) or SMTP (email) traf-
fic passing through, that meant the hotel had a vulnerable 
wireless setup. The process took about ten minutes per hotel, 
except for hotels that required authentication. That took a 
few more minutes and more assistance from hotel employees 
to breach.
Ogle checked in as a guest at eight hotels with wired 
networks, since that was the only way to gain network access. 
Once in the room, he would once again load up BackTrack 
and begin to analyze the network to see whether there were 
shared folders that were viewable, to see if he could break 
into the hotel’s router (since the default password is rarely 
changed), and to see whether he could capture packets from 
other people’s rooms by turning on the network card’s pro-
miscuous mode. As with the wireless tests, he recorded ap-
proximately 1,000 packets and ran these through Ethereal’s 
filters to see whether there were any unauthorized types of 
traffic. If there were, it meant that the hotel’s wired network 
was likely using a hub, rather than a more secure router or 
switch.
As a final step, Ogle visited the “W Dallas–Victory” 
hotel, to interview Domenic Carmona, the director of IT, so 
that the researchers could learn about industry best prac-
tices and to understand the costs (in both time and money) 
in setting up a properly secured network. We also wanted to 
find out first-hand what the threats were to network security 
in hotels. In addition, we wanted to find out whether the 
forward thinking of Carmona’s particular hotel was by his 
own endeavor, or whether Starwood Hotels and Resorts 
(the national chain which owns the W brand) was thinking 
seriously about the potential liabilities of having a vulnerable 
computer network.
Results
Combining all methods of research—surveys, on-site test-
ing, and the interview—we concluded that hotels in the U.S. 
are generally ill-prepared to protect their guests from the 
security problems inherent in Ethernet. We were forced to 
conclude further that most hotels have installed an amenity 
that they may not be managing properly.
A Snapshot of the U.S. Hotel Network Setup 
Our survey questions were as formal and non-biased as 
possible. Comprehensive data include information regarding 
types of hotels, types of networks offered, quantity and quali-
ty of IT employees, and network topology. The survey results 
give what we consider an accurate snapshot of the hotel in-
dustry at the time of the study. The 147 survey respondents 
represented diverse hotels, of which about two-thirds were 
branded (roughly reflecting the distribution of U.S. hotels).8
Our survey indicated that 78.9 percent of responding 
hotels offer wired internet access (and have done so for an 
average of three years), and 92.5 percent offer wireless access 
(for an average of 20 months, see Exhibits 2 and 3). The pre-
dominance of wireless networks demonstrates the demand, 
but the issue of ensuring security remains in question. To 
that point, only 20.6 percent of the hotels have had reports 
of wrongdoing on their computer networks in their current 
form.
Effective security requires only one strong IT employee, 
and it turned out that the median number of full-time, regu-
lar employees on the hotels’ IT staff was one. There were vir-
tually no part-time or temporary IT employees at any of the 
hotels. Just over one-third of the hotels reported that their 
IT employee had received no training at all before beginning 
work, while 18.2 percent of hotels required training to the 
point of certification in an IT-related field (Exhibit 4). The 
average percentage of the IT budget spent on security was 
9.5 percent, though some hotels spent as much as 80 percent 
and others nothing (Exhibit 5). We take this as an indication 
of managers’ lack of security consciousness.
8 R. Swig, Independent Hotels: The New Brand Alternative, June 2000, 
retrieved March 10, 2008, from www.hotel-online.com/Trends/Swig/
Swig_IndependentBrand.html.
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Looking at the hotels’ network topology we found that 
a total of 72.7 percent used either router- or switch-based 
technology. However, 19.5 percent of the hotels had simple 
hub-based topology (Exhibit 6). In a wise approach, most 
of the hotels (82%) separated their own business’s network 
from the one used by guests. The most secure way of doing 
this, by having two completely unassociated networks, was 
used by 63.6 percent of the respondents.
Security Check
As explained above, we collected data on forty-five hotels 
in eight cities. Of those tested, eleven were independent 
properties. All but one of the independent hotels offered 
wireless access, whereas twenty-nine of the thirty-four 
branded hotels offered wi-fi. This difference is not significant, 
given the small sample size, so for sake of the argument we 
will consider the two types of hotels to be equivalent in this 
regard.
Encryption. We found that encryption is not a widely 
used defense against network penetration. Just six of the 
thirty-nine wireless properties were using encryption. This 
is a meager outcome considering the importance of data 
protection. Four of the six hotels that used encryption also 
charged guests for use of their network. While this is a tiny 
sample, this might indicate that guests who pay for internet 
access get a better, safer experience. We’d like to think that 
the hotels use the revenue thus earned and put it into IT 
security, but we have no indication that this is the case.
Exhibit 6
hotels’ network topology
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Terms of service. One way to help a hotel’s defense in 
the case of litigation regarding its insecure wireless network 
is to require guests to accede to a terms of service agree-
ment. These typically have verbiage which indemnifies the 
hotel against future complaints arising out of any use of its 
network, including lost or stolen data. Five of the indepen-
dent hotels and thirteen of the branded hotels used terms of 
service agreements. Interestingly, all six hotels that charged 
for the access enforced a terms of service agreement. 
Best Practice Case Study: The W Dallas
Let’s turn our focus to a hotel that we find epitomizes the 
properly implemented hotel network that is both accessible 
and secure, the W Dallas–Victory. Typical of most hotels, 
the W Dallas hotel has an IT staff of one, namely, Domenic 
Carmona, director of information technologies. He has been 
the architect of the hotel’s network, which we found to be set 
up properly. The Dallas hotel’s system is part of Starwood’s 
initiative to keep guests’ information safe, while maintaining 
easy access to the internet. Referring to Starwood, owner of 
the W Hotels brand, Carmona told us that “they really want 
to streamline the process but make it safe for the guest.” He 
reiterated, “We like to keep everything streamlined and iden-
tify every device and node on our network and log traffic 
from each device.”
One particular challenge for an IT team is to balance 
the twin goals of pleasing the guest and maintaining the 
network’s safety. Forgetting this balance, network engi-
 Note: Graph numbers are based on a survey of 147 U.S. hotels.  Not all 
hotels responded to all questions. 
Cornell Hospitality Report • September 2008 • www.chr.cornell.edu   15
neers sometimes set up barriers which hinder guests from 
enjoying their experience, and which require guests to jump 
through hoops and become a computer expert themselves 
just to read their email. Ease of use and security are not mu-
tually exclusive, though, as. Carmona makes obvious in his 
use of Virtual LANs, or VLANs, on the network.
VLANs work by setting up an intranet, or internal 
network, which is physically attached to the rest of the 
network. The difference in a VLAN and a regular Ether-
net setup, however, is that a VLAN permits access only to 
those computers which are on your own intranet. Since no 
information coming out of another user’s network passes 
by your computer, the possibility of capturing other peoples’ 
information is eliminated. If one were to set up VLANs on 
all ports in the hotel—that is, to make every single room its 
own VLAN—the chances for ARP spoofing and other hacks 
are minimized. VLANs also give the hotel more control 
over use of the network: “I can shut you off, turn you on, 
and I can tell what kind of traffic is going over the network,” 
Carmona points out. In short, with a VLAN the IT staff can 
easily remove the ability for a malicious user to get on the 
internet in a secure environment.
Needless to say, Carmona’s business and guest networks 
are separated physically, both operating through secure 
routers and separated from the internet by firewalls, as well 
as WPA encryption. Users have to agree to the hotel’s terms 
of service before using its network. We see little more that 
could be done to secure the hotel’s network at this juncture. 
Consequently, we judge that Carmona and the W Dallas–
Victory hotel are a model of excellence in how to properly 
implement a secure, usable, smooth, wired and wireless 
network in a hotel, one which protects the guests from intru-
sion and the hotel from liability.
Steve Gibson of Gibson Research Corporation,9 one of 
the world’s foremost leaders in computer security and host 
of the SecurityNow! Podcast, agreed that the VLAN is an 
effective security tool. He told us, “Virtual LAN technol-
ogy is a terrific solution for any sort of shared and insecure 
network environment. This effectively constrains any ‘attack’ 
to within its own VLAN. So, if … every physical port in the 
hotel would be on its own VLAN, there would be no pos-
sibility for cross-port snooping, sniffing, ARP poisoning, etc.” 
Secure Your Network
Looking at the potential for hacking, we urge hotels to 
secure their networks from would-be attackers. Though we 
acknowledge that there will always be a way to take advan-
tage of the network, the steps suggested in the checklist on 
the next page can help protect your hotel from intrusion. 
Also on the next page, we offer a checklist for hotel guests to 
consider when they use a hotel’s network. Hoteliers might 
wish to distribute this list to their guests.  n
9 S. Gibson, GRC | ARP Cache Poisoning, December 11, 2005, retrieved 
January 22, 2008, from www.grc.com/nat/arp.htm.
The wisest course for hotels 
is to secure their networks as 
much as possible, while still 
making them easy for guests 
to use.
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network Security checklist
 We are using a router or switch to manage our network traffic.
 Our hotel business and guest networks are separate—if not separated physically, at least by a strict 
software firewall.
 When guests sign on to our network, they are presented with a terms of service page that they 
must accept to progress to the internet. This terms of service document should explicitly limit the 
liability of the hotel for anything occurring on the network, whether internal or external.
 We have considered and weighed the possibilities of setting up a VLAN on our network.
 We have small but noticeable public warning signs that emphasizes that guests use the network at 
their own risk.
 We attempt to hire staff with applicable computer security certifications, or we help our IT staff 
gain certification during their time working at the hotel.
 We have a training program for all of our IT staff which emphasizes how important it is to protect 
the network from intruders, lest the company be held liable for any wrong-doing.
 Our wireless network is password protected and encrypted with the latest wireless standards; we do 
not use WEP to protect our wireless network, as it is considered futile in the security world.
 We do not block VPN traffic for our users. VPN ports are commonly used by business people, and it 
is virtually the only real, secure way a person can connect to a remote location. With this in mind, 
we strive to make sure all VPN ports and protocols are allowed through the network.
 We train our employees not to give out proprietary hotel network information to anyone who is not 
clearly authorized to have such information. In the case of questionable intent of the inquirer, our 
employees are instructed to contact a manager immediately.
Simple Precautions that Guests can take to Protect their Data
 Only send important information over the internet if you ascertain that the connection is secure. For 
browsing the web, make sure that the address in the address bar says “https://” rather than simply 
“http://”. The extra “s” means there is a “secure socket layer” between your computer and the 
website, meaning all information traveling over the network is encrypted. If possible, set up your 
email client to allow you to send using secure sockets, also, as this will encrypt the email 
information and disable it from being sniffed by an intruder.
 Make sure that up-to-date personal firewall software is installed. In any situation where someone is 
on the same network as you, you are open to attacks which exploit common computer program 
vulnerabilities. Running a firewall will help prevent any intrusions.
 If it is possible, always use VPN connections when doing anything on the internet, especially if it 
involves sensitive data. If your company does not supply a VPN connection, use an online service 
such as http://www.hotspotvpn.com or http://www.publicvpn.com to create a secure connection.
 Never connect to any “ad-hoc” or “peer to peer” wireless networks. These are almost always 
attackers disguising themselves as legitimate access points.
Note: While following the above checklist will help to ensure the network is safe, it is also important that 
the guests themselves pay particular attention to security. With that in mind, the accompanying checklist 
can be distributed to guests or posted publicly to instruct users on ways to protect their data while 
traveling. 
The above list should help to protect a guest if the instructions are followed fully. That is not to say 
the hotel guests would then be totally invulnerable to data theft, but we believe that these steps are 
the best protocol available at this writing.
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